Landlord and Tenant by Wilharm, John H.
Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 14 | Issue 3
1963
Landlord and Tenant
John H. Wilharm Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of
Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
John H. Wilharm Jr., Landlord and Tenant, 14 Cas. W. Res. L. Rev. 449 (1963)
Available at: http://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol14/iss3/16
LANDLORD AND TENANT
in the case. Final judgment was defined as that judgment which ef-
fectively and finally determines the issues after all appeals shall have
been concluded. Thereafter, the pending case in the district court was
dismissed for want of federal jurisdiction and the defendant proceeded
to make the adjustments referred to in the separate contract.
The union contended that the separate contract did not permit the
company to adjust the net credited service of the employees in the ab-
sence of a judicial decision on the merits. The jurisdiction of the federal
court, it was argued, was not an issue and the decision of the court dis-
missing the action was not a final judgment as defined. The court of
appeals, however, found that jurisdiction was in fact one of the issues
raised on defense by the employer and that the court did pass upon the
issue of jurisdiction. The court's judgment, it was held, was adverse to
the union and since the ruling was a final judgment so far as that case
was concerned, the employer had a right to make the adjustments referred
to in the contract between the parties.
EDWIN R. TEPLE
LANDLORD AND TENANT
During 1962 two significant decisions were reported. In President
& Trustees of Ohio Univ. v. Athens Livestock Sales, Inc.1 the Court of
Appeals for Athens County held that the lease in issue created a perpetual
lease, and further, offered some suggestions as to how the lease could
have been drawn more dearly. The disputed term of lease was
for and during the full term of three years . . thereafter on
a year to year basis until terminated by the lessees by one month's notice
in writing to the lessors thirty days prior to March first of the year
1940 or any succeeding year?
The court, while emphasizing that the law does not favor perpetual
leases, held that the words "thereafter," "terminated by the lessees," and
"succeeding year" could only be interpreted to mean that it was a per-
petual lease. Further, the only manner in which the lease could be
terminated would be a positive act on the part of the lessee, i.e., the giv-
ing of notice as provided.
The court suggested that the lease could have been made dearer by
the use of words such as "forever," "for all time," and "in perpetuity."
Inasmuch as the law does not favor perpetual leases, perhaps those mem-
1. 115 Ohio App. 21, 179 NB.2d 382 (1961).
2. Id. at 22, 179 N.E.2d at 383.
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